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. Introduction
As science and technology catapult forward, American consumers have
more and more options to take advantage of new medical advances.' The rising
number of surgeries performed each year is partially because of a higher
availability of elective surgeries as opposed to surgeries performed to save a
patient's life.2 Furthermore, studies show that doctors perform many elective,
but still risky, surgeries for questionable or inappropriate reasons. Doctors
also use magazine and television advertisements to lure patients into
undergoing liposuction and other purely aesthetic surgeries.4 Because anyone
with a medical license can perform cosmetic surgery, tragedies are not
uncommon.5
Medical associations cannot adequately police all doctors; some
responsibility lies with the patients to protect themselves.6 Dr. Lawrence
Horowitz, former director of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Health, stated,
"At its best, American medicine is the finest in the world. But you can't get the
best by chance-you have to work at it. And often, the choices you make are
more important in determining the outcome than the nature of the disease
1. See Joe Levine, Hold That Scalpel! You Need Thorough Research and Expert
Guidance Before You Decide Whether You Should Go Under the Knife, MONEY, Feb. 1, 1989,
at 105 (stating that more and more Americans are choosing surgery).
2. See id. (noting concern that doctors are pushing elective surgery upon unwary medical
consumers).
3. See id. (citing studies by the Journal ofthe American Medical Association estimating
that nearly half of all coronary artery bypasses, an open heart procedure, are inappropriate;
studies by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists that physicians are
performing unnecessary hysterectomies; and a study by the American Academy of
Ophthalmology that doctors are performing "investigational" eye operations too often).
4. See Gary Cohen, When Liposuction Goes Wrong, the Result Can Be Deadly, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 21,2000, at 56, 56 (noting the pervasiveness of aggressive and often
misleading marketing).
5. See id. at 57 (stating that cosmetic surgery is invasive surgery and can be a dangerous
procedure).
6. See id. at 58 (finding that state medical boards are unable to regulate doctors
effectively without patient awareness).
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itself.'7 An informed medical consumer must ask questions to make informed
decisions.8
After deciding to have surgery, a medical consumer must also make an
informed decision in choosing a surgeon.9 All surgeons are not created equal.'0
One of the most important inquiries that a potential patient can make involves
the surgeon's credentials and experience level." Realizing the importance of
an informed patient, several state legislatures have created databases allowing
consumers to obtain information about a potential doctor or surgeon with a
single phone call.' 2 The creation of such statutes demonstrates widespread
public acknowledgement that informed patients make a difference in combating
medical disasters.
3
Despite the increased media coverage and the initiative in state legislatures
to encourage informed decision-making by medical consumers, the legal system
has thus far been unwilling to respect the importance of such behavior.'
4
Consider the plight of Cecil Deville, a thirty-year-old man who recently
suffered a heart attack. After recovering from the heart attack, Mr. Deville
meets with Dr. Evil to discuss his diagnosis. Dr. Evil informs Mr. Deville that
7. See Levine, supra note I, at 105 (explaining the need for Americans to be informed
medical consumers).
8. See Deborah M. Prum, Finding a Doctor: Making the Smart Choice, CURRENT
HEALTH, Mar. 1, 2000, at 20, 20 (explaining that asking questions lessens the risk of a medical
nightmare).
9. See Levine, supra note 1, at 105 (urging a medical consumer to select carefully both
the type of surgery and the surgeon that performs the procedure).
10. See id. (noting that mortality rates for the same procedure performed at different U.S.
hospitals can vary from less than one percent to as high as twenty percent).
11. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 58 (encouraging the patient to inquire as to the specialty
in which the doctor is certified, how many procedures that the doctor has performed, and
whether the doctor has ever been disciplined or lost any malpractice suits); Levine, supra note
1, at 105 (urging patients to inquire about their surgeon's credentials, success rate for the type of
operation, and the number of such procedures that the surgeon has performed); Prum, supra
note 8, at 20 (encouraging patients who are choosing a new doctor to inquire about the doctor's
credentials and whether the physician is board-certified).
12. See Steven K. Berenson, Is it Time for Lawyer Profiles?, 70 FORDHAm L. REv. 645,
656-57 (2001) (noting that approximately two dozen states have provided for some form of
publicly accessible physician profiles).
13. See id. at 657-58 (acknowledging public realization that consumers of health care can
make worthwhile use of information relating to the background of a physician); see also
Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennen, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence
for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1595, 1597 (2002) (explaining market theory that
informed medical consumers will create greater medical safety).
14. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 223 (1985) (identifying the law's failure to respond to
pressures for greater recognition of patient autonomy).
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his life depends upon receiving bypass surgery. Mr. Deville has read several
articles about the importance of being an informed medical consumer and asks
Dr. Evil how many times he has performed such a procedure and what his
success rate has been. Dr. Evil explains to Mr. Deville all of the possible
complications of the surgery and claims that he has performed bypass surgery
over 100 times in the last year with a success rate of ninety-seven percent.
After performing research on the Internet, Mr. Deville finds Dr. Evil's
experience and success rate to be an acceptable risk. Mr. Deville consents to
the surgery.
Unfortunately, Mr. Deville's luck is not good, and he develops
complications from a blood clot following the surgery. As a result, Mr. Deville
is confined to a wheelchair for the remainder of his life. During depositions for
his medical malpractice lawsuit, Mr. Deville learns that Dr. Evil has only
performed bypass surgery twenty times in the previous year and that his success
rate was only eighty-five percent. This Note considers the legal actions
available to Mr. Deville in light of Dr. Evil's misrepresentation of his
qualifications to perform the bypass surgery.
Three theories would allow the patient in this fact scenario a cause of
action: the informed consent doctrine, the deceit-based tort of fraud, and some
states' consumer protection statutes. 5 State courts differ as to which theory is
most appropriate. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied a plaintiff's fraud
claim stating that a more appropriate basis for legal action would be the
informed consent doctrine.' 6 But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to
allow an informed consent action against a physician misrepresenting his
credentials, opting instead to endorse a fraud action. 7 The Pennsylvania court
found that using the informed consent action to include a doctor's experience
would necessitate expanding the doctrine to include personal attributes of a
physician and would only create a redundant cause of action. '8 Finally, Texas
courts allowed a deceived patient to bring a claim under the state's consumer
15. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 85 (N.J. 2002)
(finding that patient pursuing claim against doctor for misrepresenting credentials must use
informed consent); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (holding that patient
pursuing claim against doctor for misrepresenting credentials may not use informed consent but
may have an action in fraud); Rhodes v. Sorokolit, 846 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. App. 1993)
(allowing fraud claim against doctor under the state consumer protection act).
16. See Howard, 800 A.2d at 85 (refusing a separate action for fraud when a plaintiff can
pursue a physician's misrepresentations regarding experience as an informed consent claim).
17. See Dutry, 771 A.2d at 1259 (refusing to expand informed consent doctrine because
other causes of action provide adequate remedies).
18. See id. at 1258-59 (identifying previous precedent refusing to expand limited doctrine
of informed consent).
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protection statute.' 9 But this avenue is only available in a few states. 2°
Traditionally, state consumer protection statutes have exemptions for the
"learned professions" including both lawyers and doctors.2 1 More recently,
some state courts have allowed patients to sue doctors under the consumer
protection statute so long as medical negligence is not the basis of the claim.
22
This Note addresses what cause of action a state court should allow in a
situation similar to the hypothetical involving Mr. Deville and Dr. Evil. Part II
of this Note begins with an examination of the history of a patient's ability to
hold her doctor liable, with particular emphasis on the history of judicial
paternalism toward doctors and the development of the informed consent
doctrine. 23  Part III takes a more in-depth look at existing case law by
examining the three potentially available actions. 24 Part IV analyzes this case
law in light of public policy concerns focusing on the burdens of proof
presented by an informed consent doctrine and the importance of trust in a
doctor-patient relationship. 2' Finally, Part V concludes by recommending that
state courts allow a fraud action for deceived patients.26
II. Background
An analysis of the development of medical malpractice jurisprudence is
crucial to understanding this issue. To this end, this Part first focuses on
judicial paternalism in medical malpractice and the ensuing breakdown of the
tradition of protecting physicians in recent years. Next, this Part traces the
19. See Chapman v. Wilson, 826 S.W.2d 214, 219-20 (Tex. App. 1992) (allowing
patient's consumer protection claim against doctor for knowing misrepresentations).
20. See Michael Flynn, Physician Business (Mal)practice, 20 HAMLIn L. REv. 333,340-
43 (1996) [hereinafter Malpractice] (stating that only Washington and Texas extend liability
through consumer protection acts to physicians); Michael Flynn, Physician Deceptive and
Unfair Business Practices, 71 FLA. BAR J. 49,50 (1997) [hereinafter Unfair Business Practices]
(acknowledging that no case law exists but explaining that the Florida consumer protection
statute only exempts medical negligence claims and does not specifically mention physicians).
21. See Unfair Business Practices, supra note 20, at 49 (explaining the learned
professions exemption).
22. See Malpractice, supra note 20, at 342 (noting that some states allow claims against
physicians separate from negligence).
23. See infra Part 11 (discussing background of patient-doctor lawsuits).
24. See infra Part III (discussing case law involving doctor's misrepresentations to
patient).
25. See infra Part IV (analyzing case law in light of relevant public policy concerns).
26. See infra Part V (recommending that courts allow deceived patients to pursue a
misrepresentation action).
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historical evolution of the doctrine of informed consent. Finally, this Part
considers the emerging role of outcome status in managing health care quality.
A. Medical Malpractice Paternalism
The dominance of allopathic medical treatment was not the result of
market economics, but instead resulted from a political power struggle between
competing medical factions.17 Competing medical groups sought political
recognition in the name of consumer protection, claiming that "the esoteric
nature of [their] craft was understandable only to the initiated, that laymen
could not distinguish between 'charlatans' and true professionals."2 At the
turn of the century, allopaths achieved, through legislative mandates, a
monopoly right to practice medicine in nearly all states. 29 After gaining
political recognition, allopaths reinvoked this rhetoric, this time to claim that
medicine was too complex for laymen to regulate.3° Furthermore, the judiciary
deferred to the paternalistic American Medical Association's code of ethics as a
means of governing the medical profession.3
The tradition of protecting doctors began to break down amid media
disclosure in the 1980s that revealed much greater incidences of medical
negligence than the general public had previously presumed.32 From 1976 to
1986, the number of malpractice claims per 100 physicians increased more than
27. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 30-31 (1984) ("[A]n
exclusive mandate to practice medicine was waged through the political process rather than
through individual citizens' acceptance of doctors' services."). The dictionary defines
allopathic medicine as the system of medical practice that aims to combat disease by use of
remedies producing effects different from those produced by the treated disease. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 57 (1993). In most states, allopathic medicine is the
only allowed medical practice. One can contrast allopathy with homeopathy, which the
dictionary defines as the system of medical practice that treats disease by administering minute
doses of a remedy that would in healthy persons produce symptoms of the treated disease;
homeopathy is still legal in a few states. Id. at 1083.
28. KATZ, supra note 27, at 3 1.
29. See id. at 39 (noting that the defeat of homeopathy created a medical monopoly by
allopaths).
30. See id. at 45 (explaining that judicial paternalism arises from the political
acquiescence to the historical rhetoric that medical knowledge is incomprehensible to the
layman).
31. See Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, Doctor, Are You Experienced? The Relevance of
Disclosure of Physician Experience to a Valid Informed Consent, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 373, 377 (2002) (noting that the judiciary with few exceptions was more than willing to
approve the AMA's physician paternalism).
32. See Berenson, supra note 12, at 659 (citing dramatic rise in medical malpractice
claims in the 1980s).
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ten percent per year.33 Predictably, this increase in claims and greater media
exposure created a heightened emphasis by the public on judicial remedies and
patients' rights against doctors.34 Unfortunately, recent reports demonstrate
that this action has not fixed the problem; a 1999 report from the National
Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine estimated that between 44,000 and
98,000 American hospital patients die each year due to medical errors.35 The
recent move away from judicial paternalism has been only partial and has not
eliminated the enormous problem of medical error facing American patients
today.
B. Development of Informed Consent
Despite courts' paternalism towards physicians, all states have established
the doctrine of informed consent, providing at least limited rights to
information prior to surgery.36 Hippocrates, the creator of the Hippocratic oath
still given to many doctors, expressly counseled physicians to perform their
duties "calmly and adroitly, concealing most things from the patient while you
are attending to him. 37 For twenty-four centuries, patients allowed physicians
to heed Hippocrates' advice.38 However, at least in theory, patients are no
33. See id. (noting a dramatic increase in medical malpractice claims).
34. See id. at 660 (stating that public perception led the judiciary to believe that
"something must be done").
35. See id. (recognizing continuing problem with medical errors). This statistic only
covers those who die in hospitals because of medical errors. Thus, the survey does not include
medical errors involving minor surgeries occurring outside of hospitals. See Cohen, supra note
4, at 56 (stating that frequently cosmetic surgery takes place in a doctor's office, away from
potentially lifesaving emergency equipment).
36. See lheukwumere, supra note 31, at 375-80 (explaining the origins of informed
consent doctrine); see also KATZ, supra note 27, at 1-29 (documenting the history of silence
between patient and doctor from Plato until the twentieth century). Katz concludes his chapter
on the history of silence by stating, "Little appreciation of disclosure and consent can be
discerned in this history, except negatively, in the emphasis on patients' incapacities to
apprehend the mysteries of medicine . I..." Id. at 28.
37. Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 313, 313 (2002) (quoting Hippocrates, Decorum, in 2 HIPPOCRATES 279, 297 (W.H.S.
Jones trans. 1962)). Other early philosophers agreed with Hippocrates. See Iheukwumere,
supra note 31, at 376 (noting that other great thinkers echoed Hippocrates' views). For
example, Plato believed that lying to a patient was justified so long as the lie was to advance
"good and noble purposes." Id.
38. See Morris, supra note 37, at 314 (recognizing the patient's acquiescence to such a
relationship).
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longer powerless to question the decisions of their physicians because of the
adoption of the informed consent doctrine in all fifty states."
Requiring patient consent developed initially as a battery action and only
required that a doctor obtain consent for the particular procedure.40 Patient
autonomy in medical decision-making originated from a statement by Justice
Cardozo while he served as a judge on the New York Court of Appeals.4'
Cardozo declared: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages." 42 Battery was the first tort to represent patient
autonomy because the early fact patterns involved patients who either
specifically objected to an operation or patients who authorized a different
operation from the one actually performed.43 Despite the recognition of a
patient's right to consent in the early twentieth century, judicial approaches to
consent remained paternalistically protective of physicians. 44 For example, in
1955, a North Carolina court refused to hold liable a surgeon who failed to
advise his patient of the inherent dangers of the impending surgery.4s Despite
severe injuries resulting from the surgery, the court found it understandable for
a surgeon to withhold such information from the patient for the purpose of
curtailing undue apprehension in the patient.46 Clearly, this court refused to
39. See id. at 315 (explaining the transition of patients into autonomous beings capable of
questioning physicians). But see KATZ, supra note 27, at 83 (stating that the idea ofjudicially
enforced informed consent remains a fairy tale idea to which reality has yet to catch up).
40. See Morris, supra note 37, at 317-23 (tracing the battery origins of informed consent).
41. See id. at 317 (explaining the origin of the informed consent doctrine).
42. See Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (finding that
the patient should have battery action), overruled on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). But see KATZ, supra note 27, at 51-52 (noting that the strong language
supporting patient autonomy was not representative of a new movement, but instead reacted to
the defendant doctor's flagrant ambivalence to his patient's opposition to the surgery and the
doctor's deception in performing the surgery). In reality, the case did not recognize patient self-
determination but showed the unbelievable fact situation necessary forjudicial action. See id. at
52 (recognizing the difficulty in raising a faulty consent action).
43. See I BARRy R. FupRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW 315 (practitioner treatise series 2d ed.
2000) (stating that the original battery theory required nothing more than disclosure by doctors
of their proposed treatment).
44. See lheukwumere, supra note 3 1, at 377 (recognizing judicial paternalism by courts).
45. See Hunt v. Bradshaw, 88 S.E.2d 762, 763 (N.C. 1955) (refusing liability for a
surgeon despite the physician's claim that the surgery was "simple" and there "wasn't nothing to
it").
46. See id. at 766 (classifying the surgeon's decision as a mistake but not worthy of
liability).
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recognize a patient's right to bodily integrity. 47 Although many courts granted
patients limited autonomy, judicial paternalism frequently remained an
overbearing burden on the patient.48 Courts limited the tort of battery to
protecting a patient's ability to refuse the act of surgery, but the tort did not
obligate the physician to inform the patient of the risks and alternatives of the
procedure.49
During the last fifty years, the right of patients to consent has expanded
into a right to specific information about the procedure. The California Court
of Appeal coined the modem phrase "informed consent,"50 which now
represents a national doctrine of potential liability for all physicians." But
courts also abandoned using the battery action in favor of using negligence to
protect patients' rights to this information.52 Although informed consent
imposes an obligation on the physician to disclose information about a
proposed treatment to a patient to consider while deciding whether to permit
the treatment, the use of negligence law focuses the court's decision not on the
disclosure of the doctor, but on whether the patient's injury resulted from a
breach of the doctor's disclosure duty.53
After the California Court of Appeal coined the phrase, other state courts
adopted the same terminology, but the doctrine's ambiguity resulted in a split
47. See KATZ, supra note 27, at 55 (stating that Hunt is representative of the futility of
claiming a right of patient self-determination as recently as the 1950s); Iheukwumere, supra
note 31, at 379 (identifying court's refusal to consider patient's rights). This case and others
from the era illustrate not only that doctors did not talk to their patients about risks, but that
neither physicians, nor judges, nor attorneys found this either surprising or odd. See id. (noting
the accepted custom of silence between physician and patient).
48. See lheukwumere, supra note 31, at 377-79 (documenting examples of courts
refusing to find physicians liable).
49. See Morris, supra note 37, at 319 (explaining court's unwillingness to treat as battery
a surgeon's failure to disclose risks, benefits, and alternatives of a procedure). The tort of
battery protected against unauthorized behavior; the development of informed consent later
created an affirmative duty upon physicians to inform patients about the risks and alternatives of
a proposed procedure. See KATZ, supra note 27, at 59 (explaining the transition from battery
torts against doctors to informed consent actions).
50. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957) (using term "informed consent" in the court's discussion of physicians' duty to disclose).
51. See KATZ, supra note 27, at 60-61 (noting that the California Court of Appeal
introduced in a brief paragraph at the end of the opinion an ambiguous definition of a concept
signifying physician discretion and full disclosure rights in the same concept).
52. See Morris, supra note 37, at 323 (preferring negligence to handle medical consent
cases).
53. See id. at 324 (explaining that using negligence as the basis for informed consent is
another means ofjudicial paternalism protecting physicians from liability); see also I FuRRow
ET AL., supra note 43, at 316 (explaining the reasons why allowing informed consent cases as a
battery tort favors the patient).
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regarding the correct standard of disclosure.54 The Kansas Supreme Court
chose a physician-based standard of disclosure in the next major case adopting
the informed consent doctrine.55 The court stated the standard by emphasizing
that the duty to disclose "is limited to those disclosures which a reasonable
medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances.
How the physician may best discharge his obligation to the patient in this
difficult situation involves primarily a question of medical judgment."56 Thus,
in the same opinion acknowledging patients' right to information, the court also
allowed physicians an easy escape from liability.17  The physician-based
standard requires the plaintiff to offer expert medical testimony to establish that
a reasonable medical practitioner would make the disclosure and then to show
that the defendant failed to comply with this standard.5 Many early cases
discussing informed consent adopted this "doctor knows best" test for the duty
of disclosure. 59 Thus, while courts in most states grew to accept the informed
consent doctrine, the courts continually favored a paternalistic physician-based
standard.60
Perhaps because of expanding recognition by courts of a physician
conspiracy of silence, which made it very difficult for many patients to make
out a prima facie case under the physician-based standard, courts in the early
1970s created a reasonable patient standard. 6' Although not the first case to
announce a patient standard, the celebrated case of Canterbury v. Spence62 is
54. See lheukwumere, supra note 31, at 380-81 (explaining that the result of Salgo's
ambiguity was a split between a reasonable physician standard and a reasonable patient standard
to determine the scope of a doctor's duty to disclose information to the patient).
55. See id. (noting adoption of physician standard in Kansas).
56. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960).
57. See KATZ, supra note 27, at 66-67 (finding that the opinion's ultimate effect was
quite limited although the court's pronouncement of disclosure rights was radical). When the
opinion's ambiguities were pointed out to Justice Schroeder, he authored another opinion
unsuccessfully attempting to clarify this new right of self-determination. See id. at 67 (noting
Justice Schroeder's inability to clarify the new doctrine).
58. See I FuRRow ET AL., supra note 43, at 318 (explaining the need for expert testimony
under physician standard).
59. See lheukwumere, supra note 31, at 383 (recognizing other courts' adoption of the
physician standard).
60. See id. at 385 (identifying courts' continued paternalism towards doctors).
61. See id. at 385-86 (noting that the physician standard required expert testimony that
the reasonable physician would have disclosed the information and that plaintiffs were unable to
find doctors willing to testify against other doctors). But see KATZ, supra note 27, at 56
(claiming that no "conspiracy of silence" prevented doctors from testifying; instead the silence is
a direct result of the long established medical custom that "reasonable physicians" do not
disclose the risks of procedures to patients).
62. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Canterbury, the U.S. Court
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the leading case.63 The Canterbury court rejected the physician standard,
stating, "Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular
therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which
physicians may or may not impose upon themselves." 64 In jurisdictions
adopting the Canterbury reasonable patient standard, courts no longer required
plaintiffs to produce expert testimony to establish what information the
physician should have disclosed.65 Instead, courts allowed juries to choose
whether a "reasonable patient" would have desired the information in
66question. Although commentators frequently cite Canterbury for the
reasonable patient rule, Judge Robinson, the author of the opinion, succumbed
to the same pressures as his forbearers and followed his bold statement of
patients' rights with escape valves for the physicians to avoid this standard.67
For example, the opinion states that "prevailing medical practice must be given
its just due" when medical judgments enter the physician's disclosure
decision.6' Despite its shortcomings, commentators recognize Canterbury's
positive role in reinvigorating the policy of a patient's right to self-
determination of medical treatment.69
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit debated the proper standard of care necessary for a doctor
regarding disclosure of operating risks prior to surgery. Id. at 779. After visiting his doctor
complaining of back pain, the nineteen-year-old plaintiff was subjected to an operation without
being informed of the risk of paralysis. Id. at 777. Following the operation, the plaintiff
became paralyzed from the waist down. Id. The court began its analysis by focusing upon a
patient's right to bodily integrity. Id. at 780. After finding a duty of the physician to disclose
relevant information, the court also considered the scope of this duty. Id. at 783-84. The court
rejected the use of the commonly accepted physician standard because a patient's right to self-
determination should not hinge upon a custom created by physicians themselves. Id. at 784.
Instead, the court chose to define the scope of the physician's duty of disclosure according to
the reasonable patient's need for information. Id. at 786.
63. See lheukwumere, supra note 31, at 386 & n.71 (calling Canterbury the "lightning
rod" for the adoption of the reasonable patient standard and the most well-known informed
consent case).
64. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784 (footnote omitted).
65. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical Providers: A First Look
at the New Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 5, 27 (1992) (discussing plaintiffs'
proof burden in an informed consent case). But see I FuRRow ET At., supra note 43, at 319
(noting that expert testimony is still frequently needed to clarify treatments and the probabilities
of risk as well as to testify that the physician should have been aware of such risk).
66. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 65, at 27 (discussing reasonable patient standard).
67. See KATZ, supra note 27, at 74 (noting that the rule laid out is far from clear).
68. Id. at 74-75 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1972))
(noting that the opinion allows doctors to use the medical professional standard as a defense for
failing to disclose the risks of a procedure) (emphasis added by Katz).
69. See id. at 76 (noting that Canterbury reminded courts that the doctrine's purpose is to
foster individual choice); lheukwumere, supra note 3 1, at 390 (noting that informed consent's
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Thirty years after Canterbury, states' standards defining a physician's duty
to disclose information still vary.70 Nonetheless, courts are nearly unanimous in
categorizing informed consent as a negligence action.71 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin identified five reasons why negligence became the preferred theory
of liability.72 First, the doctor is acting for the patient's benefit, and the failure
to disclose is not equal to an unauthorized procedure.73 Second, failing to give
information is not an affirmative, intentional act.74 Third, failing to disclose is
not a contact or touching. 75 Fourth, the doctor's malpractice insurance often
does not cover intentional misconduct.76 Finally, failure to disclose information
does not warrant the possibility of punitive damages.
77
Despite the near unanimity among state courts, commentators find glaring
weaknesses in placing the informed consent doctrine under the rubric of
negligence. 78 Although some of the reasons supporting the negligence standard
seem to reflect a misreading of tort law,79 the overriding principle behind
choosing the negligence theory was the ability of judges to insulate further
physicians from liability.80 Under the negligence theory of liability, ifa patient
successfully establishes a breach of the duty to inform, the patient still has
purpose is to allow patients access to information to make an informed decision).
70. See Iheukwumere, supra note 3 1, at 391 (noting that the physician standard remains
the majority view); see also 1 FuRRow ET AL., supra note 43, at 318-19 (noting that the patient
standard is the modem trend and is approaching a majority position).
71. See Morris, supra note 37, at 319 (discussing courts' reluctance to characterize
informed consent as a battery).
72. See Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 312-13 (Wis. 1973) (explaining reasons
for adopting a negligence standard of liability).
73. See id. (same).
74. See id. (same).
75. See id. (same).
76. See id. (same).
77. See id. (same).
78. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 37, at 319-21 (refuting each of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's reasons for choosing the negligence action); see also Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort"
as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 LAW,
MED., & HEALTH CARE 210, 212 (1988) (suggesting that by merely invoking the principles of
battery law to acknowledge the patient's dignitary interest in adequate disclosure, courts could
accomplish the policy goals of informed consent jurisprudence).
79. See KATZ, supra note 27, at 68 (noting that the preference for negligence may be a
result ofjudges simply misunderstanding the law of battery); Morris, supra note 37, at 321-22
(noting that currently existing intentional, dignitary torts would allow informed consent to be a
battery).
80. See KATZ, supra note 27, at 69 (explaining that the choice of negligence law made the
possibility of patients proving a legally cognizable injury significantly less likely).
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another difficult proof problem in establishing causation. 81 First, the patient
must establish injury causation by proving that the procedure chosen by the
physician resulted in the plaintiff's injuries.82 Next, the patient must also
establish decision causation by proving that the patient would have chosen a
different course of action had he known the withheld information. 3 This
higher burden of proof imposed on the patient is likely one reason courts have
refused to use a battery theory.14 Despite the flaws in its reasoning, the
informed consent doctrine today appears to be deeply rooted in negligence
law.85
Although the informed consent doctrine still fails to provide a true right of
patient self-determination, the doctrine is a work in progress and has created an
awareness of patients' rights to information.8 6 The judicial development of
informed consent has become one of the forces altering the attitudes of a new
generation of doctors toward their patients.8 7 Because informed consent
reflects one of society's highest values, individual autonomy, courts will
continue to struggle with the conflicting needs to protect physicians from
overbearing liability and the need to protect patients' right to choose
appropriate medical treatment. s8 Outside of the courtroom, the doctrine also
has positive effects, as medical schools are now training doctors in the
importance of communication with patients and no longer are teaching the
virtues of silence.8 9
81. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 65, at 27 (explaining causation proof problems).
82. See id. (same).
83. See id. at 28 (same).
84. See Morris, supra note 37, at 320 (stating that the reasons given for adopting a
negligence theory are unpersuasive and that negligence liability has decreased plaintiffs'
opportunity for recovery).
85. See id. at 323 (explaining reasons courts have fitted physicians' disclosure duty into
the tort of negligence).
86. See KATZ, supra note 27, at 83-84 (stating that the doctrine has promoted an
atmosphere in which patient freedom has the potential to survive and grow).
87. See I FuRRow ET AL., supra note 43, at 315 (documenting the effect of the informed
consent doctrine).
88. See KATZ, supra note 27, at 49 (noting judges' inability to fashion an informed
consent doctrine that provides patients liberty of choice yet also retains physician protection
against needless liability); FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CoNsENTTOTREATMENT: A PRACTICALGUME, at
xv (3d ed. 2002) (noting that patient autonomy is likely to be a subject of renewed interest in the
future because "[flederal patient rights standards and state legislation are driving this interest
along with the watershed of information available on the Interet").
89. See Barry R. Furrow, The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health
Care: From Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing Outcomes, 26 Hous. L. REv. 147, 182 (1989)
(explaining positive effects of informed consent despite its many shortcomings).
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C. Health Care Quality and Outcome Management
Despite the goal of medical malpractice claims and the informed
consent doctrine to eliminate the "bad apples" in the medical field and to
create a better health care system, medical error remains an alarmingly
high cause of death and injury. 90 The failure of medical malpractice
litigation to deter costly medical errors has led some commentators to
urge the use of competitive market forces to control the rising incidence
of medical error. 9' Market advocates believe that informed consumers
will shop for health care services based on quality and thereby drive
poorly performing doctors out of business.92 For consumers to influence
the medical market, however, they must have access to quality assessment
information. 93
Avedis Donabedian's pioneering work on health care quality
assessment has instigated a new theory of protecting against medical
error-outcome analysis.94 Donabedian defines "outcomes" as "change[s]
in a patient's current and future health status that can be attributed to
antecedent health care." 95 Meaningful study of outcomes is not always
easy because although some outcomes, like death, are clear-cut, many
others, such as patient attitudes and satisfaction levels, are more difficult
to measure.96 Nonetheless, some states are beginning to amass databases
of physician profiles containing disciplinary actions, experience levels,
and awards and honors held by individual physicians. 97  One
commentator has concluded that "greater sophistication in the statistical
modeling is only a matter of time."9' As more information becomes
90. See Sandra G. Boodman, No End to Errors, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2002, at Fl (stating
that medical error kills more Americans than breast cancer, traffic accidents, or AIDS).
91. See Mello & Brennan, supra note 13, at 1595 (stating that professional dominance has
minimized the ability of educated consumers to control the market).
92, See id. at 1597 (explaining the market theory).
93. See id. (same).
94. See Furrow, supra note 89, at 155 (1989) (stating that the outcome assessment in
theory is the best evaluation method because it directly relates to the goal of medicine-making
the patient better).
95. 1 AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS
ASSESSMENT 82-83 (1980).
96. See Furrow, supra note 89, at 155-56 (explaining the difficulties of acquiring
outcomes data).
97. See Berenson, supra note 12, at 656-57 (discussing state physician profile
legislation).
98. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 65, at 7.
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accessible to medical consumers, economists hope market forces will
eliminate many of the medical errors that current reliance on ex post facto
malpractice claims have been unable to prevent.99 Because consumers
will never have perfect information, examination of all outcomes is not
possible, but states are recognizing the value of making outcomes
information accessible to medical consumers.1°°
Although the allure of a market based health care system has caused
other nations to emulate its principles in reforming their own health care
systems, medical consumers have yet to affect significantly the health
care market by flocking to better performing health plans, hospitals, or
physicians.'O Barriers to achieving a market health care system include
lack of awareness of the available information, difficulty in interpreting
the available information, and the inability of many medical consumers to
choose their physicians because of insurance restrictions or travel
distance. 10 2  Even assuming that quality statistical information on
outcomes becomes available, the largest obstacle to a self-regulating
health care marketplace remains determining how to make consumers
believe that the quality of physicians does vary and how to ensure
consumers that they have a choice in selecting a physician.103
Unfortunately, the legal system does not currently protect patients
who are attempting to make informed medical decisions based on even
the simplest health care quality indicator-a physician's experience level.
Despite Dr. Evil's deliberate deception in answering Mr. Deville's
inquiry about Dr. Evil's experience level, state courts have not provided a
clear cause of action to hold Dr. Evil liable for his misrepresentations.*14
99. See Frances H. Miller, Medical Discipline in the Twenty-First Century: Are
Purchasers the Answer?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 34 (1997) (listing the potential
benefits of increased information resources).
100. See id. (same).
101. See E.C. Schneider & T. Lieberman, Publicly Disclosed Information About the
Quality of Health Care: Response of the U.S. Public, 10 QuALrry IN HEALTH CARE 96,96 (June
2001) (explaining the irony that consumers do not appear to actually use the available
information despite nations emulating the system).
102. See id. at 98-99 (listing the barriers to achieving a functioning health care market).
103. See id. (discussing the necessary consumer mindset to create an economically
regulated health care market).
104. See supra Part I (considering hypothetical situation between Dr. Evil and Mr.
Deville).
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11X. Exploring the Approaches of the State Courts'05
Most state courts have yet to address Mr. Deville's situation directly,
and the minority of courts that have done so have taken remarkably
divergent positions. Perhaps because the emphasis on patients acting as
informed consumers has only recently developed, state courts have only
decided a few cases similar to Mr. Deville's situation. Nonetheless,
patients like Mr. Deville must be able to rely on the legal system to
protect their right to such inquiries.
A. Informed Consent
The first state court to address a doctor's deceitful responses to patient
inquiries upheld a patient's informed consent action against the doctor.10 6 In
Johnson v. Kokemoor,'0 7 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled on whether
evidence that a physician had misrepresented his experience to his patient was
admissible in an informed consent action.' 8 The plaintiff's family physician
referred her to the defendant, a neurosurgeon, for treatment of her frequent
headaches.' °9 The defendant diagnosed an enlarging aneurysm on Johnson's
brain and recommended surgery. 0 During surgery the defendant successfully
clipped the aneurysm, but the surgery rendered Johnson an incomplete
quadriplegic following the operation."' Prior to surgery, Johnson specifically
asked the defendant about his experience in performing this type of operation;
Kokemoor replied that he had performed the surgery "dozens" of times and
"lots of times."" During discovery, the plaintiff learned that Kokemoor had in
fact very limited experience with aneurysm surgery and had never operated on
105. When considering the following case law, one must remember that although the
previous Part examined the history of informed consent, the current status of the doctrine's
evolution varies from state to state.
106. See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 509 (Wis. 1996) (finding that evidence
that a doctor misled the patient about his experience in performing surgery is admissible in an
informed consent action).
107. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
108. Id. at 498.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 499. Johnson remains unable to walk or to control her bowel and bladder
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an aneurysm such as the plaintiff's. "3 In addition, the plaintiff also introduced
evidence that Kokemoor misrepresented the morbidity and mortality rate
associated with this type of procedure.
114
The Wisconsin Supreme Court began its analysis of the issue by tracing
the history of the state's informed consent doctrine back to Canterbury and the
reasonable patient standard.' The court quoted Canterbury in defining a
material risk as occurring when "a reasonable person, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego
the proposed therapy."'1 16 In rejecting the defendant's proposed bright line rule
that it is error as a matter of law in an informed consent case to admit evidence
regarding the physician's experience, the court stressed that determining what
information is reasonable for each patient involves examining the facts and
circumstances of each case. 1 7 The facts and circumstances of Johnson's
surgery included evidence that Johnson made direct inquiry of the defendant's
experience and that basilar bifurcation aneurysms are more difficult than any
other type of aneurysm surgery and are among the most difficult procedures in
all of neurosurgery." 8 In its conclusion, the court cited to the plaintiff's brief,
which admitted "[i]t is a rare exception when the vast body of medical literature
and expert opinion agree that the difference in experience of the surgeon
performing the operation will impact the risk of morbidity/mortality as was the
case here."" 9  Thus, the court found that Johnson's direct inquiries of
Kokemoor's experience together with the unusual complexity of this procedure
caused evidence regarding his experience to be material under the facts and
circumstances of this case.' 20
The Kokemoor decision was the first case to discuss the relevance of a
physician's experience to the informed consent doctrine, and the case spurred
both criticism and praise.' 2' After Kokemoor, many plaintiffs and
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 501.
116. Id. (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
117. Id. at 504.
118. Id. at 505.
119. Id. at 510.
120. Id. at 505. In the original trial, the jury concluded that the defendant failed to inform
the plaintiff adequately of the risks associated with her surgery and that a reasonable patient, if
fully informed of the risks of the surgery, would have withheld consent from the defendant;
thus, upholding the admission of such evidence affirmed the jury verdict in favor of Johnson.
Id. at 497.
121. See Iheukwumere, supra note 31, at 402, 406 (calling the case an "audacious and
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commentators have used the precedent in an attempt to make physician
experience part of the mandatory disclosure required in all informed consent
cases. However, a careful reading of Kokemoor does not support this
position. Kokemoor only allows a jury to find a doctor's experience material
under the particular facts and circumstances of this case-the patient directly
inquired about his doctor's experience and experts agreed that because of the
complexity of the surgery, physician experience impacted the likelihood of
success.121 On its facts, Kokemoor does not stand for the proposition that a
doctor whose patient fails to inquire about his physician's experience level
must disclose such information.' 24 Furthermore, the decision does not even
clearly establish that a patient who makes a direct inquiry of his physician's
experience in a less complicated procedure would have a valid informed
consent action.
25
The most recent case to consider a doctor's deceitful response to a query
about his credentials also found the physician's misrepresentations to be
actionable under informed consent. 26 In Howard v. University ofMedicine &
Dentistry of New Jersey,127 the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the
causes of action available when a patient contends that his physician
misrepresented his credentials and experience at the time that the doctor
obtained the patient's consent to surgery.128 The plaintiff, Howard, had a
history of cervical spine disease, and after he was involved in two automobile
accidents, his treating physician referred him to the defendant to consider
surgical options.'2 9 Howard had 'two pre-operative consultations with the
defendant before consenting to surgery. 130 The plaintiff contended that during
well-reasoned ruling," but also noting that other commentators reacted to the case "with alarm,
and attacked its foundation as unsound").
122. See id. at 407-13 (listing cases after Kokemoor deciding whether experience is
material to informed consent).
123. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text (identifying facts of the case).
124. See id. (same).
125. See id. (same). The unique finding of Kokemoor is that physician-specific information
can, under the right facts and circumstances, be material in an informed consent case. See
Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 504 (Wis. 1996) (rejecting defendant's proposed bright
line rule that it is error as a matter of law to admit evidence in an informed consent case
regarding a physician's experience).
126. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 300 A.2d 73, 85 (N.J. 2002)
(rejecting the plaintiff's fraud claim by stating that the action should be informed consent).
127. Howard, 300 A.2d at 73.
128. See id. at 75 (setting forth the issue in the case).
129. Id. at 75-76.
130. Id. at 76.
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the consultation his wife asked Dr. Heary, the defendant, whether he was board
certified and how many similar operations he had performed. 3 The defendant
responded that he was board certified and had performed approximately sixty
corpectomies in each of the previous eleven years. 32 The surgery was
unsuccessful, and Howard filed a malpractice action. 133 During discovery,
Howard learned that Heary was not board certified and that he had only
performed "a couple dozen" corpectomies during his career.' 34 Based on the
new information, Howard unsuccessfully moved to amend his complaint to
include a fraud action.
135
In examining the issue, the court looked to other state courts that had
addressed this issue.'36 The court noted that Wisconsin allowed a claim based
on lack of informed consent and that although several state courts hinted that a
fraud-based claim would be appropriate, none had held to that effect. 37 The
New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, "The thoughtful decision of the
Appellate Division notwithstanding, we are not convinced that our common
law should be extended to allow a novel fraud or deceit-based cause of
action ....,,3 Interestingly, New Jersey precedent seemed to support
Howard's fraud cause of action by naming an exception to the rule that any
consent by a patient prevents a battery theory; the exception provided, "If
consent was obtained by the use of fraud or misrepresentation, an action for
battery may be appropriate."'' 39 The Howard court quickly distinguished this
precedent stating that such an exception applies only when the
misrepresentation "induced plaintiff to proceed with unnecessary surgery."'4°
Because the physician's misrepresentation in this case may have misled
Howard about material information needed to grant an informed consent, the
court found, "Stripped to its essentials, plaintiff's claim is founded on lack of
informed consent."'141 Other jurisdictions have also used the fact that a




134. Id. at 76-77.
135. Id. at 77.
136. Id. at 81-82.
137. Id. at 82.
138. Id. at 82.
139. Tonelli v. Khanna, 569 A.2d 282, 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
140. Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 300 A.2d 73, 83 (N.J. 2002) (emphasis
added).
141. Id. at 84.
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precedent supporting a potential battery action.1 42 Furthermore, the Howard
court stressed its reluctance to allow such a claim when the damages from the
fraud arise exclusively from the doctor-patient relationship involving the
corpectomy procedure. 143 The court stated its unwillingness to allow a patient
in Howard's position to pursue punitive damages or to circumvent the proof
requirements of both causation and damages imposed by the traditional
informed consent action. 1
44
After rejecting Howard's fraud claim, the court continued its analysis by
examining the validity of an informed consent action under these facts.145 The
court traced New Jersey's history of informed consent establishing that New
Jersey, like Wisconsin, uses the reasonable patient standard to determine what
information a doctor must disclose. 146 Unlike the Kokemoor court, the New
Jersey Supreme Court explicitly stated that informed consent does not normally
include the duty to inform the patient of experience or credentials. 47 However,
when the plaintiff specifically asks such questions, the court concluded a jury
could reasonably find that the physician's misrepresentation of his experience
was a material risk for the patient. 148 Directly after admitting the possibility of
proving a valid informed consent action, the court continued by pointing out
the "difficulty inherent in meeting the materiality standard required in order for
physician experience to have a role in an informed consent case."'149 The court
explained that a possibility of materiality exists if the defendant's true level of
experience could enhance substantially the risk of paralysis from undergoing a
142. See Paulos v. Johnson, 597 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that
"because Johnson made the misrepresentations as precursors to Paulos's surgery, the claims
present a pure informed consent issue"); see also infra notes 325-28 and accompanying text
(discussing the "gravamen" of the claim theory).
143. See Howard, 300 A.2d at 84 (stating tort of fraud is actionable "only when the alleged
fraud occurs separately from and subsequent to the malpractice ... and then only where the
fraud claim gives rise to damages separate and distinct from those flowing from the malpractice"
(quoting Spinosa v. Weinstein, 571 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991))).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 82-86.
146. Id. at 79.
147. See id. at 83 (noting that no court has ever found, nor does the court in this case hold,
that a doctor has a duty to detail his experience as part of the required informed consent
disclosure). Kokemoor's failure to limit its holding explicitly to patients who specifically ask
their physician about credentials and experience resulted in many commentators urging courts to
interpret the case as creating a new disclosure duty. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying
text (explaining that some commentators have urged that courts use Kokemoor as a springboard
to requiring mandatory disclosure of experience).
148. Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 300 A.2d 73, 83 (N.J. 2002). Unlike
Kokemoor, this court did not emphasize the complexity of the surgical procedure provided.
149. Id. at 84.
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corpectomy; a jury could then find that a reasonably prudent patient would not
have consented to the procedure had the physician not misrepresented his
experience.150 In addition, the two-pronged causation inquiry necessary for a
successful claim will "impose a significant gatekeeper function."'5 ' Although
the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately reached the same result as
Kokemoor, the result for the plaintiff was very different. In Kokemoor the
court accepted the plaintiffs proffered cause of action-informed consent;
however, in Howard the court rejected the plaintiff's proffered cause of action,
fraud, in favor of what the court viewed as the more difficult to prove cause of
action, informed consent. 5 2 Therefore, the court stated that Howard's only
valid cause of action would be under informed consent and then explained that
he was unlikely to prove such a case.' 53
Disappointed patient advocates reacted negatively to the court's rejection
of a separate fraud cause of action, calling the ruling disturbing. 54 Bruce
Nagel, attorney for Howard, commented on the ruling claiming that "[i]t
created a shield . . .. It insulates doctors when they lie to patients."'"55 Noting
the apparent inequitable treatment of medical consumers, Nagel stated, "You
can win damages for fraud from a salesman who lied about the capabilities of a
refrigerator or a car, but you can't sue a doctor for fraud when you hire him
because he lies about his credentials and you become a quadriplegic.'05 6 In
contrast, Matthew Schorr, the attorney representing the defendant doctor,
explained the ruling as "mean[ing] physicians can continue defending claims on
merits rather than frivolous claims going forward. This decision refocuses the
150. Id.
151. See id. at 85 (stating that the misrepresented experience of the defendant must
substantially increase a plaintiff's risk of paralysis from undergoing the procedure and that this
substantially increased risk must cause a reasonably prudent person not to consent to undergo
the procedure).
152. See id. (rejecting a fraud claim in favor of the informed consent action so long as it is
consistent with the court's stringent requirements). Furthermore, unlike Howard, the decision
in Kokemoor did not specifically reject a separate fraud cause of action. See Johnson v.
Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Wis. 1996) (identifying issue of the case as whether a
doctor's failure to accurately disclose information was material to an informed consent case).
153. Howard, 300 A.2d at 82.
154. See Tanya Albert, Dispute over Credentials Not a Case of Fraud, AMNEws, July 22,
2002 (reporting reactions to the New Jersey Supreme Court decision), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2002/toc0722.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2003) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
155. Id.
156. Henry Gottlieb, No Cause of Action in Fraud When Doctors Lie About Their
Credentials in New Jersey, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 27, 2002, at 4.
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attention on medicine, where it should be."'157 The postcase comments are
striking when compared to the Kokemoor outcome because what the Wisconsin
Supreme Court viewed as a victory for the plaintiff, lawyers in the Howard case
viewed as a devastating defeat to the plaintiff.'58
B. Fraud
Although an informed consent action may be available for Mr. Deville in
some jurisdictions, he may also have the opportunity to plead a fraud action
against Dr. Evil. The fraud cause of action allows a better opportunity for
recovery because a fraud action would focus on physicians' lies, not on their
medical abilities.5 9 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that consent does
not protect against liability for invasion or harm when a person is induced to
consent by another's misrepresentations.160 The physician-patient relationship
is a fiduciary one; therefore, the court must judge a doctor's representations to
his patient by the high standard applicable to fiduciaries.' 6' A doctor's liability
for misrepresentation or failure to state the facts adequately can legally void the
patient's formally expressed consent to a procedure, allowing the procedure to
be actionable as an assault and battery. 162 Because fraud vitiates the patient's
consent, the claim resembles the early consent cases in which a doctor
performed a procedure without any consent. 63 This action fundamentally
differs from the typical negligence informed consent action that focuses upon
the information disclosed. To prove a claim of fraudulently obtained consent,
the patient must establish that the physician made a material misrepresentation
of fact, knowing it to be false.' 64 Because fraud vitiates the patient's consent, a
157. Albert, supra note 154.
158. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff's attorney found the informed consent action
"virtually impossible to prove" under the court's ruling).
159. See Gottlieb, supra note 156, at 4, 7 (explaining fraud claim as focusing on the
damages caused by the deceit).
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1979) (explaining the rule for
consent under misrepresentation); 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery § 16 (2002) (same).
161. See I DAVID W. LOUISELL &HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 8.10[2]
(2002) (explaining basis for fraud recovery against a physician).
162. See id. (explaining fraud as a theory of recovery against physicians).
163. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (discussing early cases that allowed
patients a battery action when the doctor operated without consent).
164. See ROZOVSKY, supra note 88, at 1:14 (explaining the proof requirements of a fraud
action against a physician).
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court can charge a doctor with battery after finding the doctor guilty of
fraudulently receiving the patient's consent. 1
65
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court disallowed a patient's fraud
claim, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not specifically address whether a
patient could bring an action in fraud. 66 However, in its analysis of informed
consent, the court acknowledged the overlap between actions in
misrepresentation and informed consent, stating that the "allegations made and
evidence introduced by the plaintiff might have fit comfortably under either
theory."' 67 Thus, Kokemoor's acceptance of an informed consent action under
limited facts and circumstances did not preclude a fraud action.
6
1
Prior to the unanimous decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court believed that Howard
could bring a valid cause of action in fraud under New Jersey law.' 69 The
intermediate appellate court compared Howard's consent to cases involving
"ghost surgery," or when a patient consents to one doctor performing surgery
but in reality another doctor performs the operation. 70 In a prior New Jersey
case involving ghost surgery, the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed a battery
cause of action observing, "Even more private than the decision who may touch
one's body is the decision who may cut it open and invade it with hands and
instruments .... Few decisions bespeak greater trust and confidence than the
decision of a patient to proceed with surgery.' 7 1 In ghost surgery, a battery
action is appropriate because the patient never gave consent for the particular
surgeon to operate. 72 Similarly, the court found that Dr. Heary did not have
Howard's permission to operate because Howard only consented to a doctor of
significantly greater experience. 73 In essence, the appellate court found that
Dr. Heary, in lying about his qualifications and experience, misled Howard
about the true identity of the physician who would perform the surgery.'74
Therefore, unlike the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Appellate Division did
not force Howard to establish the difficult causation standard required by
165. See Howard v. Univ. of Med.& Dentistry ofN.J., 768 A.2d 195,198 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001) (using fraud to vitiate patient's consent and create a battery action).
166. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (clarifying the finding of Kokemoor).
167. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 504 n.29 (Wis. 1996).
168. See id. (discussing viability of fraud claim).
169. Howard, 768 A.2d at 198.
170. Id. at 197.
171. Id. (quoting Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 437 (N.J. 1983)).
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informed consent because it found that Howard had a valid fraud cause of
action. 175
In Duttry v. Patterson,7 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly
rejected the plaintiff's informed consent claim, stating that the proper action
would be one of fraud. 17 Because the patient did not bring a fraud action
against the doctor, the sole issue before the court was whether the lower court
erred as a matter of law in determining that a doctor's misrepresentations
regarding his qualifications and experience were relevant to an informed
consent claim. 178 The plaintiffs family physician had recently diagnosed her
with esophageal cancer and recommended that she consult with Dr. Patterson,
the defendant, regarding whether she needed surgery.' 79 During this
consultation, Duttry questioned Dr. Patterson regarding his experience in
performing the recommended surgery.8 Dr. Patterson told Duttry that he
performed this type of procedure approximately once every month.' 81 Relying
upon this information, Duttry consented to the surgery. 82 Dr. Patterson
performed the procedure on June 5, 1989, and three days later a leak developed
that ruptured necessitating emergency surgery, which eventually led to Duttry
developing further complications including permanent damage to her lungs. '83
After bringing suit for medical malpractice, the plaintiff discovered that
Patterson had in fact only performed the procedure nine times in the preceding
five years. 84 At trial, Duttry sought to introduce this evidence, but the trial
court found the evidence inadmissible because it was not relevant to the
informed consent claim.' 85  The intermediate appellate court reversed
acknowledging that a physician's experience is not normally relevant, but
finding that this information is material to an informed consent claim when the
particular patient raises specific questions regarding that experience.1
86
175. See id. (explaining that Howard, once he established fraud, would have a battery
action and would not need to establish the difficult causation issues associated with informed
consent).
176. Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001).
177. See id. at 1259 (refusing to expand the doctrine of informed consent into a catch-all
doctrine).
178. Id. at 1257.
179. Id. at 1256.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1256-57.






BETWEEN THE SCALPEL AND THE LIE1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis with a discussion of
the informed consent doctrine, noting that the doctrine requires physicians to
provide patients with material information necessary to determine whether to
proceed with the procedure.'87 The court explained that the "material
information" the physician must disclose requires that the physician "advise the
patient of those material facts, risks, complications and alternatives to surgery
that a reasonable person in the patient's situation would consider significant in
deciding whether to have the operation."' 88 Furthermore, the court noted that
information particular to the surgeon, rather than information concerning the
procedure itself, was generally not relevant to an informed consent claim.189
In refusing to distinguish such precedent on the basis of Dr. Patterson's
intentional misrepresentations in response to his patient's specific questions,
the court noted that the doctrine of informed consent is a limited one focusing
only on imparting information relative to the surgery itself. 90 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the fact that the patient inquired about his
physician's experience irrelevant because the doctrine is based on an objective
standard that only requires disclosure of what a reasonable person would want
to know; therefore, the court concluded that mandatory disclosure under
informed consent "does not shift depending on how inquisitive or passive the
particular patient is."' 9' In rejecting Duttry's informed consent action, the court
noted that a physician who misleads a patient is not immune from all lawsuits,
by noting that "we are merely stating that the doctrine of informed consent is
not the legal panacea for all damages arising out of any type of malfeasance by
a physician."' 92  In cases in which the physician provides inaccurate
information regarding his qualifications and experience in performing a
procedure, the patient should pursue a cause of action for misrepresentation.' 93
The decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was largely in accord
with the amicus brief submitted by the Pennsylvania Medical Society (PAMS),
a nonprofit corporation formed by members of the medical profession to
participate in matters of concern to physicians and their patients. 194 The brief
187. Id. at 1258.
188. Id. (quoting Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 1992) (emphasis added)).





194. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Medical Society at 1-2, Duttry v.
Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001) (No. 69 MD 2000) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (explaining
the purpose of the brief).
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acknowledged that physicians should allow a patient to question them about
issues of concern and that physicians should provide accurate information in
response; however, the brief opposed expanding informed consent to cover
these issues.' 95 In opposition to allowing an informed consent claim, PAMS
emphasized that informed consent, since its inception in Pennsylvania
jurisprudence, has always focused on the surgical procedure at issue, not on the
surgeon's personal characteristics. 96 The brief argued that holding physicians
liable under the doctrine in response to direct questions about their credentials
or personal problems necessarily replaces the objective patient standard with
the widely rejected subjective patient standard. 97 In explaining the policy
concerns of such a limitless obligation, PAMS stated, "Once informed consent
is unmoored from its focus on the benefits and complications of surgery,
physicians can have no certainty that they are complying."' 98 But by remaining
focused on the procedure itself, not only can courts more easily administer the
standard, but surgeons are able to ensure the simple and accurate conveyance of
information about the procedure in a standard manner.' 99 Because the specific
issue of whether a fraud action should exist for Duttry was not before the court,
the brief does not state a position; however, PAMS does recognize that other
actions against the physician would be proper.20°
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rejection of an informed consent
action in favor of allowing a fraud suit outraged at least one commentator. 20 ,
Brad Rostolsky stated that a doctor cannot obtain a patient's true consent when
the doctor misrepresents information in response to patient inquiries.20 2 Courts
designed the doctrine of informed consent to ensure that doctors disclose all
information material to the reasonable patient. 203 Because scientific studies
consistently show that better surgical outcomes result from physicians who
195. Id. at 11 (stating PAMS's position on the issue).
196. Id. at 12-16 (tracing history of informed consent in Pennsylvania jurisprudence).
197. Id. at 10 (noting that such a holding would impose a limitless obligation on the doctor
to disclose all information any patient may deem material).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 17-18 (noting that such a ruling would create a "moving platform" of
physicians' standards of disclosure).
200. Id. at 19-20 (noting that a misrepresentation action would be more proper).
201. See Brad M. Rostolsky, Comment, Practice Makes Perfect: Experience-Related
Information Should Fall Within the Purview ofPennsylvania's Doctrine of Informed Consent,
40 DUQ. L. REv. 543, 559 (2002) (stating that the fraud doctrine is inadequate to protect patients
from physicians' deceit).
202. Id. at 556-57 (noting that it is clear that informed consent is not met by providing
false information).
203. Id. at 544-47 (explaining the informed consent doctrine).
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possess greater experience, Rostolsky finds unappealing the court's refusal to
accept that a physician's experience would concern a reasonable patient.2 4
Rostolsky found the court's intimations about a fraud action unsatisfactory
because fraud actions, unlike informed consent, have not been "tailored through
years of judicial interpretation to address the intricacies of doctor-patient
interaction. 20 5 Thus, at least one commentator finds the rejection of an informed
consent action in favor of allowing fraud actions unsatisfactory.
The Duttry case is particularly interesting today because of new tort reform
legislation enacted after the case by the Pennsylvania legislature. The legislation
explicitly provides a statutory informed consent action for patients whose
physician knowingly misrepresents his or her professional credentials, training, or
experience.20 6 Therefore, the state legislature apparently has also rejected the
court's reliance on common law fraud to protect adequately patients whose
doctors misrepresent their credentials or experience. 0 7
In addition to the Duttry case, a few other courts have briefly addressed the
issue of whether a physician is liable for fraud by misrepresenting his credentials
in dealing with other issues. The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland refused to allow a plaintiff to bring an informed consent action under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) when the claim centered on allegations that
a Navy physician misrepresented his experience. 208 The FTCA does not waive
sovereign immunity for claims involving misrepresentations. 2°9 The court found
that "misrepresentations peculiar to the person of the surgeon or physician are just
that-misrepresentations-and cannot be brought under the FTCA by recasting
them in the guise of a negligence action based on lack of informed consent.0
10
Thus, the federal court decided that the patient's informed consent claim was
nothing more than artful pleading to avoid sovereign immunity.21' Additionally,
204. Id. at 557 (stating that the scientific and medical communities have recognized
experience-related information as valuable information).
205. Id. at 558.
206. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(d)(2) (West 2002) (providing an informed
consent action for future plaintiffs similar to Duttry).
207. No party has used the statute, and it remains to be seen whether its existence will
preclude a patient from seeking recovery under a common law fraud claim.
208. See Wachter v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1420, 1421 (D. Md. 1988) (refusing to
allow the claim under the FTCA).
209. See id. (stating that FTCA excludes misrepresentation claims from waiver of
sovereign immunity).
210. Id.
211. Ironically, most plaintiffs face the reverse problen- courts finding that fraud claims
are artful pleadings designed to avoid the stricter proof requirements of informed consent. See
infra notes 325-28 and accompanying text (explaining the "gravamen" of the claim theory).
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in North Carolina, a man brought an action against his physician for
misrepresenting his prior medical experience as it related to performing the
surgical procedure.2'2 Unfortunately, the court failed to reach a final ruling
because the defendant was able to prove that the statute of limitations barred the
claim.2' 3 Therefore, despite the consideration of a fraud claim by several courts,
no court has expressly allowed a fraud action against a doctor misrepresenting his
credentials.
C. Consumer Protection Statutes
In addition to pursuing recovery under a common law fraud claim, some
states may allow Mr. Deville to pursue a claim under the state's consumer
protection statute covering unfair and deceptive trade practices. Traditionally,
these consumer protection statutes exempted the "learned professions," including
physicians, lawyers, and priests.21 4 However, in 1979, the United States Supreme
Court held that no blanket exemption existed to protect these professions under
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).2 5 Because states modeled their
consumer protection statutes after the FTC Act, some states have attempted to
clarify their own statutes in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling.21 6 A few states
responded by specifically excluding the learned professions from coverage by
21statute.2 17 In other states, the courts continued to exempt the learned professions
because self-regulating boards already governed such professions.21 8 However,
most states have allowed courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether learned
professionals are engaging in trade or commerce subject to state consumer
219protection statutes.
The Washington Supreme Court was the first state court to allow a patient
to pursue a deceptive trade practices claim against her physician.220 Although
212. See Foard v. Jarman, 378 S.E.2d 571,576 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining plaintiff's
claim), vacated on other grounds by 387 S.E.2d 162 (N.C. 1990).
213. See id. (dismissing the case due to statute of limitations).
214. See Malpractice, supra note 20, at 338 (explaining history of state unfair and
deceptive trade practice statutes).
215. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88 (1975) (finding no blanket
exemption for lawyers).
216. See Malpractice, supra note 20, at 339 (explaining state reaction to Goldfarb).
217. See id. (noting that North Carolina, Ohio, and Maryland statutorily excluded the
learned professions).
218. See id. (explaining another approach that states have taken following Goldfarb).
219. See id. (explaining majority approach).
220. See id. at 341 (discussing the extension of consumer statutes to cover physicians).
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several other courts have since allowed such claims, these courts have all
struggled with drawing a line between claims relating to entrepreneurial aspects
of the medical practice, which a consumer protection statute allows, and claims
arising out of a doctor's negligence, which plaintiffs must bring under a
medical malpractice claim.221 All states agree that claims grounded in a
doctor's negligence are properly brought as medical malpractice actions and not
deceptive trade practices claims.222 Therefore, whether such states would allow
Mr. Dev i lie's claim depends on whether the court finds a misrepresentation of a
doctor's experience in response to a patient's direct question to be an
entrepreneurial aspect of the practice of medicine.
The Texas Court of Appeals allowed a patient to bring suit under the state
consumer protection statute when her doctor made false and misleading
statements.223 The court concluded that knowing misrepresentations are not
within the plain meaning of negligence and that a plaintiff can bring such
claims under the state's consumer protection act.224 In a previous case, the
same court allowed a consumer protection claim against a dentist for
exaggerating his expertise in wisdom tooth extraction.225
In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals has taken a narrower view of
entrepreneurial activity. The New York court allowed plaintiffs' claim against
the operators of an in vitro fertilization program for misrepresenting success
rates and health risks associated with the procedure.226 In dictum, the court
emphasized the importance of the plaintiffs' proof that the defendants had
disseminated such false information to the public through promotional
materials, advertisements, and slide presentations at seminars.227 The court
distinguished these plaintiffs from a victim of deception in a single transaction
221. See id. at 341-46 (listing state courts that have included physicians within consumer
protection statutes).
222. See id. at 345 (noting that the decisions by state courts that do not exempt physicians
from consumer protection liability will only allow claims related to the entrepreneurial aspects
of the practice of medicine).
223. See Rhodes v. Sorokolit, 846 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. App. 1993) (allowing a claim
based upon a doctor's knowing misrepresentations to his patient).
224. See id. (same).
225. See Chapman v. Wilson, 826 S.W.2d 214, 219-20 (Tex. App. 1992) (allowing a
patient's consumer protection claim against doctor for knowing misrepresentations).
226. See Karlin v. IVF Am., Inc., 712 N.E.2d 662, 666 (N.Y. 1999) (refusing to allow a
blanket exemption for providers of medical services and finding plaintiffs' claim of lack of
informed consent separate and distinct from the consumer protection issue).
227. See id. at 667 (explaining the reason that plaintiffs' claim constituted entrepreneurial
activity governed by the statute). But see Taylor v. Medenica, 479 S.E.2d 35, 44 (S.C. 1996)
(defining entrepreneurial activity as an action capable of repetition by the defendant in the
future that thus meets the public interest requirement).
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in which the only parties truly affected by an alleged misrepresentation would
be the plaintiff and defendant. 22' Therefore, even states that do not exempt
physicians from their consumer protection statutes may limit liability to a
narrow definition of entrepreneurial activity.
At least two states, Ohio and Pennsylvania, have refused to apply
consumer protection statutes to physicians. However, one commentator finds
these cases distinguishable from court decisions in other states. 9  In
Pennsylvania, the court refused to allow a patient to sue her physician for an
unsuccessful surgery for weight loss based on the doctor's statements of
probable results. 230 Flynn argues that the plaintiff in the Pennsylvania case
failed to properly emphasize the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of
medicine and the business aspects of a physician's statements to his patient.23'
Although consumer protection statutes offer plaintiffs another possible cause of
action, state application of such statutes to physicians remains uncertain.232
IV. Policy and Analysis
Mr. Deville's questioning of Dr. Evil prior to his operation is precisely the
behavior many commentators and market economists believe can curb the
alarming rate of medical error in the American health care system.233 Part 111
examined the various approaches state courts have taken in response to patients
similar to Mr. Deville. This Part analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of
adopting a fraud cause of action instead of relying solely on the informed
consent doctrine.
Informed consent and fraudulent misrepresentation protect against two
different kinds of wrongful acts.234 Commentators praise Kokemoor and its
228. See Karlin, 712 N.E.2d at 667 (distinguishing this case from Pennsylvania cases that
refused to allow a consumer protection claim).
229. See Malpractice, supra note 20, at 343-45 (discussing cases refusing to include
physicians in consumer protection statutes).
230. See id. at 344-45 (explaining facts of Pennsylvania case).
231. See id. (stating that plaintiff failed to argue the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice
of medicine).
232. See Unfair Business Practices, supra note 20, at 50 (noting that although the
application of Florida's Unfair Trade Practice statute to physicians is uncertain, consumer
statutes like Florida's are underutilized when it comes to pursuing the business practices of
doctors).
233. See supra notes 6-13, 90-98 and accompanying text (explaining the need for patients
to become informed medical consumers).
234. See RozovsKY, supra note 88, § 1.3.3, at 1:16 ("There is a difference between a case
premised on lack of informed consent and one that is based on misrepresentation or deceit.").
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progeny for allowing informed consent to cover the experience and
qualifications of surgeons and hope such cases will lead to a new revolution in
informed consent.235 Instead of focusing solely upon informed consent, this
Note attempts to look at the possibility of using another cause of action under
existing tort law that would apply to the specific fact pattern in Kokemoor and
its progeny. First, this Part analyzes the benefits of using a fraud action under
the mechanics of current tort law. Second, this Part demonstrates through
public policy arguments that a fraud action is a more acceptable solution than
creating a broader informed consent action.
A. The Principles of Fraud and Informed Consent
Fraudulent misrepresentation is a stand-alone tort that recognizes an action
for harms resulting from misinformation even without a showing of physical
injury.236 Courts list between four and nine elements of the common law tort,
but they agree in substance that the plaintiff must prove (1) an intentional
misrepresentation (2) of fact or opinion (as distinct from a promise) (3) that is
material and (4) intended to induce and (5) that does induce reasonable reliance
by the plaintiff, (6) proximately causing pecuniary harm to the plaintiff. 37
Fraudulent misrepresentations relied upon by a plaintiff can also negate
consent.2"' By voiding the patient's formally expressed consent to a procedure,
fraud allows the patient to bring an action for battery based on an unconsented
touching. 239 A fraud action properly focuses the court's decision on whether
the physician actually had legal consent to perform the procedure. Courts
should judge the act of obtaining consent to a surgical procedure based on the
actual interaction between the physician and the patient. 240 Therefore, because
proof of fraud voids consent, a fraud action prevents a person from obligating
235. See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed
Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. I, I (1999) (stating that a
revolution in informed consent is brewing).
236. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 469 (2000) (explaining the definition of
fraudulent misrepresentation).
237. See id. § 470 (listing the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation).
238. See id. § 100 (stating that misrepresentation nullifies consent).
239. See I LOUISELL& WILLIAMS, supra note 161, § 8.10[2] (identifying possible basisof
liability upon a finding of physician fraud).
240. For example, if a physician made all required disclosures to a drunken patient and
then had him sign that he consented to a nonurgent procedure, the consent suit could be brought
as a battery because there was no legal consent. See DOBBS, supra note 236, § 98 (stating that
consent is invalid from an intoxicated person).
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herself based on false information and provides a legal remedy to a patient that
has a different surgeon than the surgeon she intended to perform the
procedure.24'
In contrast, the typical informed consent action focuses on whether the
information disclosed to the patient was satisfactory. A negligence standard
applies to determine whether the physician disclosed all material information
about the nature of a proposed procedure.242 Informed consent recognizes
patients' need to weigh the procedure's risks, benefits, and alternatives.243
Most jurisdictions, either by statute or case law, have attempted to define the
necessary disclosures.244 Although states vary as to whether they define the
scope of the duty using either a physician or prudent patient standard, both
standards rely on a finding that the information is "reasonably" necessary to a
patient's decision to undergo the procedure.245 Although courts have supported
a patient's right to information about the procedure, courts have been much less
likely to enforce a patient's right to information about the surgeon.24 6 Typical
informed consent litigation occurs as a result of doctors' nondisclosure of
information that state law deems necessary as a minimum level of information
every patient should know before agreeing to a procedure.2 47 Courts have not
adopted a pure subjective standard because of fears that a patient would always
claim that the undisclosed information was so important to her that she would
have declined treatment.2 48 Therefore, the informed consent doctrine's purpose
is to provide standard information to all patients in an attempt to increase
patient autonomy.
249
241. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.10 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that no
person is bound by consent if the consent is obtained by a misrepresentation).
242. See DOBBS, supra note 236, § 250 (explaining principles of informed consent).
243. See Amicus Brief, supra note 194, at 14 (identifying traditional focus of informed
consent).
244. See 3 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 161, § 22.05 (explaining how states
determine the scope of physicians' duty of disclosure).
245. See supra notes 40-70 and accompanying text (explaining how the scope of
disclosure has developed and is currently defined under both the physician and the reasonable
patient standards).
246. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 65, at 29 (explaining that courts generally do not
find provider-specific information material in informed consent cases).
247. See Shultz, supra note 14, at 226-27 (explaining purpose of informed consent
litigation).
248. See I FuRRow ET AL., supra note 43, at 319 (identifying reasons why courts have
refused to adopt a subjective standard of disclosure).
249. See id. at 347-48 (identifying the effects informed consent has created in the medical
profession).
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Because of the doctrine's negligence standard, informed consent
does not offer adequate protection to a deceived patient whose doctor
deliberately provided false answers to patient inquiries.250 Informed
consent is not a flexible doctrine. Indeed, Grant Morris criticized the
doctrine's inflexibility stating, "The real concerns of a flesh-and-blood
patient are of no concern to the courts if a hypothetical being would not
consider them material., 21' Because Mr. Deville's situation is analogous
to the patient who endures a surgical procedure without any consent, a
fraud cause of action, which would allow Mr. Deville to bring a battery
action, is the most appropriate cause of action. Judge Cardozo's
powerful words apply directly to Mr. Deville's situation, "Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in
damages., 25 2 Dr. Evil's misrepresentation voided the consent provided by
Mr. Deville and a battery action is appropriate. State courts have
recognized liability for battery when the surgeon who performs the
procedure is not the surgeon that the patient authorized.25 3  When a
surgeon performs a procedure after misrepresenting his experience, the
situation is analogous to "ghost surgery., 214 One commentator noted that
these decisions reserve battery "for cases of deliberate, material deviation
from the patient's consent. 25 5 Mr. Deville's situation is fundamentally
different from the typical informed consent action where a surgeon fails
256to disclose the required information. In addition, a comparison
between the causation requirements and the specific injury redressed by
informed consent and fraud actions further reveals the inadequacy of an
informed consent action under Mr. Deville's circumstances.
250. See Morris, supra note 37, at 368-71 (acknowledging the limits of current informed
consent law).
251. Id. at 368.
252. Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on
other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
253. See, e.g., Pernav. Pirozzi,457 A.2d431,438 (N.J. 1983) (finding a battery action for
"ghost surgery"); Pugsley v. Privette, 263 S.E.2d 69, 74 (Va. 1980) (same).
254. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale behind the
New Jersey Superior Court's decision to affirm a fraud claim).
255. Thomas Lundmark, Surgery by an Unauthorized Surgeon as a Battery, 10 J.L. &
HEALTH 287, 293 (1995-1996).
256. See id. at 292 (stating that "the quantum level of the case is distinguishable from the
next class of cases in which the surgeon fails to reveal all of the risks of the surgery").
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1. Causation
In an informed consent action, even assuming a patient can establish
that a doctor withheld information regarding a material risk, two difficult
causation questions remain as barriers to the patient's recovery. 257 A
plaintiff first must establish injury causation, which requires that the
plaintiff prove to the jury that the plaintiffs decision to undergo the
procedure resulted in harm that would not have otherwise occurred if the
plaintiff had made a different choice.258 Proving injury causation requires
conjecture about both what alternate procedure the doctor may have
performed and the risks of such an alternate procedure. 9  Injury
causation exists because courts cannot base negligence damages on
deprivation of patient autonomy alone; only physical injuries resulting
from an increase in the risk of harm are compensable. 26°
Arguably, requiring a patient to prove her injury would not have
occurred if she had chosen a surgeon with more experience is an unfair
burden on the patient. Although studies demonstrate a correlation
between doctor experience and success of an operation, such a statistical
study may not convince a jury that more likely than not the injury would
not have happened had the patient used a different physician. 26' Because
of the patient's right to bodily integrity, a patient should be able to
choose the risks she takes without regard to whether her choices are more
likely than not to prevent an injury. Unlike an informed consent claim,
establishing a fraud claim vitiates the plaintiffs consent and allows a
battery action for unconsented touching.262 Under a battery theory, the
patient may recover all damages resulting from the unconsented touching
without a showing of injury causation. 63
In addition to proving injury causation, a patient must also establish
decision causation to recover successfully in an informed consent
action.264  Decision causation requires proving to the jury that a
257. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 235, at 9 (noting that establishing that a doctor
withheld material risk is not the most difficult part of an informed consent action).
258. See id. (defining injury causation).
259. See id. at 9-10 (identifying the uncertainty in establishing injury causation).
260. See id. at 10-11 (explaining the need for injury causation).
261. See id. (same).
262. See I LoUISELL & WiLLiAMS, supra note 161, § 8.10[2] (identifying the possible basis
of liability upon a finding of physician fraud).
263. See id. (explaining the advantages of using a battery theory for patients).
264. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 235, at 9 (identifying second causation problem).
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"reasonable patient" supplied with the omitted information would not
allow the physician to perform the recommended procedure. 265  This
objective decision causation rule is unique to medical informed consent
cases; in a normal negligence case, establishing the defendant's breach
and its causal role in injuring the plaintiff would be enough.266 After
describing decision causation, Dan Dobbs commented, "the rule does not
reflect the [normal negligence] causation requirement but imposes some
additional and most unusual obstacle." 267  Another commentator has
observed that the causation principles of informed consent have mutated
"what began as a concern for individual autonomy almost necessarily
comes to be subjected to standardizing and oversimplifying criteria that
are alien to individuality., 268  Nonetheless, arguments that this
"reasonable patient" requirement undercuts the goal of patient autonomy
269have failed to eliminate the requirement.
Under a fraud claim, the patient must prove only that she in fact
relied upon the misrepresentation. 270  Dobbs explains that to prove
reliance the patient must prove that she chose the procedure because of,
or partly because of, the representation. 271 Thus, under a fraud cause of
action, the patient's subjective reliance is sufficient. Therefore, unlike an
informed consent action, fraud protects patients who take the initiative to
gather information above and beyond the information a "reasonable"
patient would deem necessary.
265. See id. (explaining decision causation). But if the recommended procedure was so
risky in comparison to its potential benefits that most reasonable patients would refuse such an
operation, the doctor's act of recommending the procedure would almost certainly constitute a
straightforward medical malpractice action for negligent treatment rather than one for lack of
informed consent. Id. Thus, to bring a "true" informed consent case, the patient presupposes
that the doctor acted reasonably in choosing the recommended treatment. Id. But, this
assumption makes establishing decision causation difficult because "reasonable patients
generally follow the nonnegligent recommendations of their reasonable doctors." Id.
266. See DOBBS, supra note 236, § 250 (stating that the required decision causation for
informed consent is unique to such cases).
267. Id.
268. Shultz, supra note 14, at 250.
269. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 235, at 8-9 (acknowledging courts' refusal to
accept patient autonomy arguments).
270. See DOBBS, supra note 236, § 474 (identifying requirement of reliance).
271. See id. (defining the reliance requirement).
1549
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515 (2003)
2. Compensable Injury
Informed consent forces physicians to disclose routine information about a
pending procedure, but the doctrine does not fully protect individual
autonomy.2 72  Under informed consent, the only injury that constitutes a
compensable harm is an adverse medical outcome; informed consent provides
no cause of action for a plaintiff whose surgery is successful. 273 Because of the
generally low level of treatment risks, the vast majority of potential plaintiffs in
such a cause of action still cannot litigate because they lack the required
274injury. Requiring an adverse medical outcome fails to protect the patient's
right to personal autonomy over his own body. Medical uncertainty
necessitates many choices of patient treatment options, and values outside of
medicine shape these decisions.275 Shultz finds that the reasoning behind
requiring an adverse medical outcome "reflects a pervasive fear that plaintiffs
making such claims will recover when they have not 'really' been injured, or
that doctors will be held liable when they have not 'really' done anything
wrong. ,276 Although such a policy argument may be applicable to a typical
informed consent case, no person can claim that a doctor has not done anything
"really" wrong by intentionally deceiving his patient with misinformation. A
deceived patient suffers an injury to his personal autonomy rights at the time
the surgery occurs because a surgeon other than the one the patient intended to
hire is operating on his body. Informed consent fails to protect against such
harms.
In contrast, under a fraud action, proof of a physician's fraudulent
misrepresentation allows a patient to bring an action in battery for an
unconsented touching regardless of physical injury.277 The battery action better
protects patient autonomy because battery actions do not provide physicians a
defense based upon the medical outcome.278 The physician is liable for
physical harms resulting from the battery, but he is also liable for his
272. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 925-26
(1994) (noting the doctrine's inconsistency with a commitment to individual autonomy).
273. See id. at 925 (identifying the source of compensation in an informed consent suit).
274. See id. at 936 (explaining that potential plaintiffs often cannot successfully litigate
informed consent cases).
275. See Shultz, supra note 14, at 276 (explaining the need to protect patient autonomy as
a separate injury because the "conflicts of value and judgmnnt that are inherent in all human
decision are both consequential and problematic").
276. Id. at 232.
277. See DOBBS, supra note 236, § 28 (identifying damages available for simple battery).
278. See Shultz, supra note 14, at 224 (stating that professional competence is not a
defense to a battery action).
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impermissible touching that is not physically harmful. 279 Because battery is a
dignitary tort, the traditional rule allows the plaintiff to recover substantial
damages even without proving physical injury or mental distress; nonetheless,
in cases involving medical procedures, a jury should also consider the ultimate
benefit to the patient in determining the appropriate award.
280
In addition, under a battery theory, the jury will also have the discretion to
award punitive damages.281  The New Jersey Supreme Court cited the
possibility of punitive damages as one of its reasons for denying the plaintiff a
fraud cause of action.28 2 The possibility of awarding punitive damages is not a
reason to deny a fraud claim. Punitive damages are only available to the jury
when the defendant "has committed quite serious misconduct with a bad intent
or bad state of mind such as malice." 283 Punitive damage awards act as a social
sanction against physicians.284 The remedy vents community outrage, deters
the specific doctor from committing similar wrongs in the future, and deters
others in the medical community from engaging in similar misconduct.285 A
physician's fraudulent misrepresentation of his experience in response to a
patient's direct inquiry is behavior thatjuries should deter. Punitive damages
may be the most effective method of ensuring doctors are not misleading their
patients.18' Dr. Evil is likely to be confident that Mr. Deville will never
discover his true level of experience. Furthermore, Dr. Evil currently knows
that even if Mr. Deville were to discover the truth, so long as he successfully
performs the operation, no liability will attach as a result of his
misrepresentations. The possibility of punitive damages may be the only
279. See Lundmark, supra note 255, at 288 (explaining that the fact that battery has
occurred is sufficient for damages).
280. See DOBBS, supra note 236, § 42 (identifying types of damages for dignitary harm
without physical harm).
281. See id. (stating that punitive damages are permitted when the defendant's conduct and
state of mind are especially odious).
282. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 82 (N.J. 2002)
(identifying policy reasons why the court refused to recognize a fraud action).
283. DOBBS, supra note 236, § 381.
284. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in
Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not "Moral Monsters", 47 RUTGERS L.
REv. 975, 1043 (1995) (stating that punitive damages are designed to warn the medical
community that certain actions will not be tolerated).
285. See id. at 1044 (stating purpose of punitive damages).
286. See id. at 1006, 1018 (stating that contrary to popular opinion, punitive damages may
actually be too few to protect the public because punitive damage litigation has resulted in
improved practice parameters and has removed incompetent physicians from the medical
community).
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sufficient deterrent to prevent Dr. Evil from taking this calculated risk.287 The
jury never has an obligation to impose punitive damages; they merely have the
option in the appropriate situation.288 Therefore, courts should not view the
availability of punitive damages as a reason to reject a fraud action.
Furthermore, a battery action allows courts to consider the particular
factual issues surrounding the doctor's misrepresentation at the valuation stage
rather than as part of the causation analysis. At least one commentator has
argued that difficult problems of uncertainty, prediction, and credibility
regarding what would have happened had the physician provided the patient a
choice are more appropriately analyzed as questions of valuation. 289 Evaluating
such questions within the framework of injury valuation rightfully does not
question the factual existence of harm to the patient.2 90 Informed consent
ultimately rejected such protection for patients because, "[g]iven the absolute
nature of battery, the narrowness of its defenses, and the breadth of its
remedies, doctors could end up paying significant damages after providing
faultless medical treatment, simply because some minor informational aspect of
the consent process was questioned. '' 29' Nonetheless, jurisdictions retain the
battery action against physicians in situations in which a physician has
performed a medical procedure without any consent because such grossly
inappropriate behavior as operating without consent does not warrant
292protection.
Although the negligence standard of informed consent adequately protects
the prototypical case, the prototypical case is not representative of all cases
implicating an autonomy interest.293  Doctors who misrepresent their
experience, credentials, and qualifications are not at risk of unacceptably harsh
results. Because fraudulent misrepresentations void consent, a battery action is
287. The author does not mean to imply that there are numerous doctors today making such
devious calculations, but the possibility of even a few such doctors in each state makes adopting
a fraud cause of action a worthwhile project.
288. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 284, at 1027 (stating that empirical analysis
demonstrates that punitive damages are not assessed for inadvertent mistakes and that most
awards arose from serious disregards of patient safety by malicious or unfit doctors).
289. See Shultz, supra note 14, at 251 (stating that valuation is a more appropriate time to
handle these difficult questions than as part of the causation element).
290. See id. (same).
291. Id. at225.
292. See id. at 225-26 (explaining the current use of battery doctrine).
293. See id. at 229 (recommending that a new tort be used to protect patient autonomy due
to informed consent's frequent failures to adequately protect the nonprototypical autonomy
interest).
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appropriate for deceived patients.294 Nothing needs to be objectively
reasonable about the patient's inquiry to deserve a truthful answer. The mere
fact that the patient believed the information important enough to warrant a
specific inquiry prior to the procedure is sufficient to require a truthful
response. A fraud action only applies to the physician that actively and
intentionally misrepresents the answer to a patient inquiry.
B. Public Policy Favors Fraud Cause ofAction
Because the fraud doctrine offers a more reliable action for a patient
similar to Mr. Deville, public policy favors adopting this approach. This
Subpart focuses on the role of trust in the physician-patient relationship, the
cost effectiveness of using a fraud action, and the treatment of other
professionals who fraudulently misrepresent their credentials and experience.
1. The Important Role of Trust
Tort law should enforce physicians' duty to maintain a trusting
relationship with their patients. Trust between physician and patient is essential
for therapeutic purposes. 295 Because of trust, a patient is willing to share
confidential and sensitive information, to place confidence in the physician's
medical judgments, and to comply with the physician's recommended
treatment. 296 Studies indicate that a correlation exists between the amount of
trust patients invest in their physician and positive outcomes in the treatment of
patients.297 Most commentators explain this correlation in reference to the
placebo effect.29 The placebo phenomenon occurs because of patients' honest
294. Anyone concerned with possible runaway verdicts must remember that the proof
burden on the patient remains difficult. The deceived patient remains responsible for proving to
a jury that the physician misrepresented a response to the patient's inquiries. The purpose of
this Note is to ensure that a patient who can establish such a misrepresentation has a valid legal
action.
295. See Morris, supra note 37, at 344 (acknowledging the importance of trust in the
doctor-patient relationship).
296. See id. (identifying the reasons trust is so vital to the doctor-patient relationship).
297. See Schuck, supra note 272, at 943 (explaining the importance of trust in physician-
patient relationship).
298. See Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When it Comes to Clinical
Research, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 423,426-27 (2001) (explaining why analysts believe trusting your
physician is correlated with positive outcomes). Studies indicate approximately one-third of
patients respond positively to placebo therapy, including placebo surgery. Id. at 427.
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belief that that their doctors are capable of healing them.299 In addition,
patients with a greater level of trust in their physicians are less likely to bring
malpractice actions. 300 One commentator stated, "Trust is the core, defining
characteristic of the doctor-patient relationship--the 'glue' that holds the
relationship together and makes it possible.0301 The recent rise of managed care
organizations has created loyalty conflicts between the patient's best interests
and the doctor's need to control costs. 302 Because recent trends are already
impacting the trust relationship between physician and patient, tort law must be
especially careful to preserve physicians' responsibility to maintain truthful
relationships with their patients. Grant Morris commented, "A patient's trust
cannot be purchased with concealment, subterfuge, or bald-faced lies. It can
only be developed through honest communication. 30 3 Therefore, the legal
system should allow patients a cause of action when a physician fails to
communicate honestly in response to a patient's direct inquiries.
The legal system can best encourage honest communication and trust
between physicians and patients by providing the patient with legal redress
when she proves that her doctor deceived her. The informed consent action
frequently fails to do this. However, allowing a patient to bring a battery action
because the doctor's fraud negated consent will serve as an effective
deterrent.3°
2. Cost-Effectiveness
In the wake of Kokemoor, several commentators have urged the legal
system to revolutionize the current informed consent doctrine to include
physicians' experience and other provider-specific comparative statistical
data.30 5 Support for a stricter version of informed consent comes from people
299. See id. (identifying why commentators believe the placebo effect is linked to patients
trusting their physicians).
300. See Schuck, supra note 272, at 943 (explaining role of trust in limiting malpractice
actions).
301. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463,470 (2002).
302. See Morris, supra note 37, at 347-48 (explaining the impact of managed care on the
doctor-patient relationship).
303. Id. at 360.
304. See supra Part IV.A. (explaining why a fraud action is better suited to deter doctors
from misrepresenting their experience in response to a patient inquiry).
305. See, e.g., lheukwumere, supra note 31, at 419 (concluding that Kokemoor's
recognition of experience as a material risk is a necessary evolution of informed consent);
Twerski & Cohen, supra note 235, at 42 (concluding that informed consent should require
providers to share provider-specific risk information).
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who believe market competition can create a safer and more efficient health
care system; but critics point out the increased costs of requiring more
disclosure. 0 6 Although current studies document that more patients want to
know more information about their health care, many patients fail to seek such
information because of habit, ignorance, intimidation, lack of economic
incentive, and the practice of referrals to designated specialists. 307 Because the
informed consent doctrine operates under the negligence standard, the doctrine
creates standards that every physician should disclose before performing a
procedure. 308 Any increase in the demands on a physician under informed
consent is naturally accompanied by an increase in costs to the health care
system.3 9 Most of this increase in costs results from the additional time
required for physicians to communicate with patients.310  Peter Schuck
recognizes, "Genuinely probing conversation, which advocates of the law in the
books demand, is dearer [in price] still."31' Schuck also recognizes the costs of
expanding the doctrine to extend beyond mere information costs and include
largely unquantifiable costs of emotional distress, which the disclosed
information might induce because of the inability of many patients to
understand, or their desire to remain ignorant. a 2 Proponents of informed
consent argue that disclosure of more information improves the treatment
decision by assuring that the patient receives crucial information.3 13 Schuck
asserts that such claims of better informed and more knowledgeable patients are
more an anomaly than the norm.314 Hence, in an era of escalating health costs,
Schuck argues that expanding informed consent is simply not cost effective.3'5
306. See Schuck, supra note 272, at 939 (suggesting that toughening informed consent law
would greatly increase costs with little corresponding benefits).
307. See id. at 931 (explaining the reasons many patients do not want more information).
308. See supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text (explaining the scope of informed
consent).
309. See Schuck, supra note 272, at 942 (stating that any increase in the disclosure
requirements of informed consent will be accompanied by an increase in costs to the health care
system).
310. See id. at 942 (discussing the high costs of increasing the requirements of informed
consent).
311. Id.
312. See id. at 942-43 (naming other costs associated with increasing disclosure
requirements).
313. See id. at 932 (acknowledging that informed consent is useful to the patient's
decision-making process).
314. See id. at 933-34 (stating that studies indicate that physicians discourage active
dialogue, opting to deliver the required information as quickly as possible, and that patients
rarely initiate a dialogue by asking questions).
315. See id. at 959 (finding that informed consent's effectiveness at achieving goals of
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Schuck concludes that the incredible costs associated with expanding the
doctrine do not justify its limited benefits to a consumer class that currently is
not ready to use effectively such information.316
In contrast, banning physicians from misrepresenting their experience to
inquiring patients is structurally different from increasing the legal standard
regarding what information physicians must routinely provide noninquiring
patients. Informed consent has effectively created a baseline of disclosure that
every physician must follow before performing a procedure.317 Increasing this
baseline to include provider-specific information will not be cost-effective
because many patients are not capable of using such information; however,
when patients specifically inquire about experience, the courts should provide
legal redress if a physician deceitfully misrepresents this information.
The fraud cause of action offers an individualized cause of action to
plaintiffs provided that they can prove reliance upon a misrepresented fact.31 8
A fraud cause of action does not entail the same costs to the health care system
as reforming the informed consent doctrine. Indeed, recognizing a fraud cause
of action raises the information costs only for those patients who are capable
and willing to use such information to make informed decisions. Furthermore,
the emotional costs are minimized because patients who specifically inquire
about information do not wish to remain ignorant of possible consequences and
are likely to be capable of understanding the information. In addition, by
protecting patients' rights to seek further information, a fraud cause of action
could also yield a reduction in health care costs by limiting overtreatment and
by allowing market forces to control the quality of health care provided.3 9 As
awareness of the startling proliferation of medical errors in the health care
marketplace increases, the media and state legislatures have urged medical
consumers to protect themselves by becoming better informed.320 Patients who
take the initiative to seek this information need protection from the legal system
to ensure the information they receive is accurate.
patient autonomy limited).
316. See id. (same).
317. See supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text (explaining the scope of informed
consent).
318. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (explaining the patient's proof
requirements in a fraud action).
319. See Shultz, supra note 14, at 295-96 (noting that modem commentators believe
informed medical consumers will result in a decrease in overall health care costs).
320. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (explaining the need for medical
consumers to protect themselves by seeking more information about their physicians before
agreeing to a procedure).
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3. Physicians Should Not Enjoy More Protection
than Other Professionals
Other professionals face liability for misrepresenting experience. In
Florida, a court found a consulting company liable for fraud when the company
misrepresented its credentials and its past experience with public offerings.32'
Another Florida court found a seller of cement pumping equipment liable for
fraud because it represented to the buyer that "it had extensive experience
making similar or identical operations" when in fact the company did not have
such experience.322 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama allowed the
buyer of a swimming pool to sue for fraud when the seller misrepresented the
experience of the company in installing pools. 323 Most interestingly, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, the same court that denied Howard's claim of fraud
against his physician, upheld a fraud action against a residential real estate
company for misrepresenting the credentials and experience of the builder
constructing homes in a new development.324 State cases routinely allow fraud
actions against professions ranging from swimming pool companies to
consulting firms.
Courts have generally been wary of allowing patients to bring fraud
actions against doctors arguing that plaintiffs should not be able to avoid
proving the elements of medical malpractice.325 Courts sometimes find that
medical malpractice is the "gravamen" of a fraud claim brought by patients
against physicians.326 New York's Appellate Division recently disallowed a
patient's fraud claim that alleged her doctor made fraudulent promises
regarding the results of her foot surgery.327 Because the injuries asserted in her
321. See Innovative Med. Servs., Inc. v. Reitz, 793 So. 2d 125, 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (concluding that allegations of such misrepresentations state a valid cause of action for
fraud).
322. See E. Cement v. Halliburton Co., 600 So. 2d 469, 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(overruling the trial court's finding that such claims were mere puffing and allowing a fraud
action).
323. See Spartan Pools v. Royal, 386 So. 2d 421,423 (Ala. 1980) (affirming ajury verdict
against the swimming pool company).
324. See Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 366 (N.J. 1997) (finding a valid
cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation).
325. See, e.g., Christenson v. Gleason, 2000 WL 133815 at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2000)
(stating that the Kansas Supreme Court has rejected claims by plaintiffs seeking to "creatively
classify" malpractice actions as fraud).
326. See id. (stating that a fraud claim will only avoid the "gravamen" test when the
physician's misconduct is beyond a breach of the legal duty which every doctor has the
obligation to uphold).
327. See Spinosa v. Weinstein, 571 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (rejecting
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fraud claim were the same as those of her malpractice claim, the court found
the fraud claim not to be separate and distinct from medical malpractice and
dismissed the action.328 Despite courts' reluctance to allow claims outside the
typical medical malpractice arena, commentators recognize the limitations of
informed consent and urge courts to expand the possibilities of patient lawsuits.
One treatise concludes its synopsis of informed consent by stating that the
"[i]nformed consent doctrine as applied in tort cases can only take us so far in
promoting physician-patient communication. 3 29  Joan Krause further
commented, "Traditional informed consent law is simply too fragile, too
slender a reed on which to rest the burden of protecting patient informational
rights in an era of health care cost containment. 3 0 Commentators believe state
tort law must play a greater role in preserving patients' rights. 3
Courts should not protect a person's right to choose a swimming pool
company based on the company's experience installing swimming pools more
than they protect a patient's right to choose his doctor based upon the doctor's
experience in performing similar surgical procedures. A patient's right to
control who touches his body demands that tort law provide adequate
protection against a surgeon who misrepresents information about his
experience or credentials to a potential patient.332 Because a person could bring
a fraud action against other professionals misrepresenting their credentials,
courts should also allow patients to bring an action for fraud against their
physicians.
In addition to recognizing a common law fraud action, state courts should
also consider applying unfair and deceptive trade practice laws to physicians.
Although only a few states have considered doing so, the majority of those that
have were willing to construe ambiguous statutes to cover the entrepreneurial
the plaintiff's fraud claim).
328. See Id. (dismissing the plaintiff's fraud claim). Ironically, the New York State
Department of Health's website urges patients to report physician fraud. NEW YORK STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, FRAUD IN MEDICINE, at http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/
opmc/fraud.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
An example of fraud specifically included in the website is "false and intentionally misleading
statements to patients" and "lying about credentials or qualifications." Id. Thus, despite the
court's disallowance of a separate fraud claim, the New York State Department of Health
recognizes the potential problems of physician fraud. Id.
329. 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, § 6-19.
330. Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost
Containment, 85 IOWA L. Rav. 261, 386 (1999).
331. See Morris, supra note 37, at 369-70 (stating that state tort law may be the only
mechanism available to protect patients' informational rights).
332. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of informed
consent to protect patients' right to receive truthful information from their physicians).
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aspects of the practice of medicine.333 The standard of proof for deception
under these statutes generally only requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that
the business practice has a tendency or capacity to deceive; the plaintiff need
not show negligence or intent.334 The standard of proof for unfairness only
requires that the plaintiff establish that the business practice offends public
policy or is illegitimate and substantially injures consumers. 3 Flynn believes
that these proof requirements "permit consumers to effectively and successfully
confront unscrupulous business practices with relative ease." '336 Permitting the
application of consumer protection statutes not only would eliminate much of
the judicial paternalism afforded to physicians, but also would help deter




Despite the movement away from judicial paternalism in medical
malpractice jurisprudence, medical error kills more Americans than breast
cancer, traffic accidents, or AIDS.338 Informed medical consumers can make a
difference in combating medical error. The legal system has thus far been
unwilling to respect the importance of informed decision-making by medical
consumers. Unless courts begin to recognize a fraud action, patients such as
Mr. Deville will frequently be without legal recourse.
Recognizing an informed consent action does not adequately protect a
patient's right to have his physician respond truthfully to questions. Because
the informed consent doctrine is a negligence-based action, courts focus their
inquiry on an objective standard: Whether the physician has disclosed
information sufficient for the ordinary, reasonable patient to make an informed
decision concerning treatment. Because the focus of an informed consent
inquiry is whether the physician provided adequate disclosure, the doctrine
does not offer any recourse to a patient who actively seeks information beyond
what a reasonable patient would find necessary to his decision.
333. See Malpractice, supra note 20, at 345-46 (summarizing the existing case law that
has dealt with the application of consumer protection statutes to physicians).
334. See id. at 347 (explaining the proof requirements under unfair and deceptive trade
practice statutes).
335. See id. (same).
336. Id.
337. See id. (concluding that applying state unfair and deceptive trade practice statutes to
physicians would deter physicians from unscrupulous behavior).
338. See Boodman, supra note 90, at FI (discussing the alarming rate of medical error).
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In contrast, a fraud action protects medical consumers who actively seek
information beyond what a reasonable patient would seek and promotes the
recent trend of encouraging informed medical consumers to actively question
their physicians.3 39 A fraud action focuses the court's inquiry on whether the
patient legally consented to have his physician perform the procedure. Such an
action protects a patient's right to actively seek information before agreeing to
undergo a surgical procedure. Courts currently recognize a battery action when
the surgeon who performs the procedure is not the same surgeon the patient
authorized. Similarly, when a doctor misrepresents his level of experience prior
to obtaining patient consent, the patient unwittingly will be forced to undergo
surgery by a physician that the patient actively sought to avoid in the first place.
Courts must recognize a fraud action in this situation because proof of fraud
allows the patient to recover for battery if the patient has not provided legal
consent to the physician.
In conclusion, this Note advocates the position of the intermediate
appellate court of New Jersey.340 A patient who specifically inquires about his
doctor's experience should have a legally enforceable expectation that the
physician will respond truthfully pursuant to the doctor's duty to his patient.
34'
A fraud cause of action does not focus on the information a physician must
disclose to his patient; rather, the action exists because the patient never
provided legal consent in the first place. 342 Recognizing a fraud action will
provide informed medical consumers similar to Mr. Deville with legal recourse
against physician deceit.
339. See supra notes 6-13 (discussing the need for informed medical consumers).
340. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion of the New
Jersey Appellate Division).
341. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (identifying doctor-patient fiduciary
relationship).
342. See supra notes 238-41 (explaining fraud's focus on legal consent).
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